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Shimonoseki is a medium-sized city of some 250,000 souls on the western 
end of Honshu, the largest island in the Japanese archipelago. In 1863 and 1864 
it was the scene of considerable friction between the Foreign Powers ( Britain, 
France, Holland and the United States ) and the Choshu clan. This article aims 
to re-examine the Shimonoseki Affair, its causes and results, using contemporary 
sources and more recent academic commentaries. 
The proximate cause of the A日air was an order issued in the n釘ne of the 
盈nperor for the “位pulsion of the Barbarians ”. The date for this was set 
as June 1863. In compliance with this order the Choshu clan opened fire on 
American, French and Dutch ships in the Strait of Shimonoseki. 
The first ship fired on was the Pembrokιa small ste釘ner belonging to the 
American company of Walsh Hall. The precise date is given by most Japanese 
sources as May 10 , 1863 ( see N幼on Rekishi Zenshuu, p. 270 and Kaikoku to
Toubaku, p. 138) . However this is using the old lunar calendar ( kyuureki or 
inreki) bracket and the Western calendar ( seireki) would have the same event 
aappening about six weeks later. The next ship to be fired on was the French 
動patch-boat Kienchan, followed finally by the Dutch navy corvette Medu叫
回mmanded by De Casembroot. 
The story of the Medusa is told in detail by the Dutch historian H.J. Moeshart 
in Chapter 7 of Contemρoraη Euroρean Writing on ]aρ，an. Having already heard 
of the treatment meted out to the American and French ships, the Dutch were 
IJ:ep町ed. The daylight engagement with three shore batteries and two Japanese 
ahips
“
lasted one-and-a-half hours as the Medusa could not make much speed ・gainst the current running through the Strait with her weak engine ”. (The 
qaFhu 
Strait of Shimonoseki, or Kanmon Kaikyo in Japanese, is only a few hundred 
metres at its na町owest point making for very slow sailing even for modem 
cargo ships, especially when they are fully laden and against the tide. ) The 
logbook states that the ship steamed 11 miles in eight hours. 
After leaving the Strait, the Medusa buried her four dead at sea and continued 
on to Yokohama. On the way she met the two French ships Semiramis and 
Tancred診，going to Shimonoseki to seek revenge for the attack on the Kienchan. 
They were preceded by the American gunboat Wラominι
The 初予oming was the first to return to Yokohama. She had lost five crew, 
and seven were wounded. However she had succeeded in crippling one of the 
Japanese ships. The French arrived later. They had demolished one of the three 
shore batteries and burnt a village, but had not managed to take a position 
on shore. 
Almost a year passed during which several letters from foreign diplomats 
to the Bakufu went unanswered. Finally in May 1864 , the patience of the foreign 
representatives had worn out and a conference was held. As Mori, the daimyo 
of Choshu, had not stopped his attacks and was blocking the Strait, action 
by the foreign powers had become unavoidable. 
The British admiral, Sir Augustus Kuper, tried to reach an agreement with 
Mouri by sending two Choshu students ( Ito Shunsuke and Inoue Bunta ) who 
had just returned from England to negotiate with Mori. Mori answered that 
he was acting under orders of the Emperor and asked for three months to 
go to Kyoto to meet the Emperor. This message was not in writing, nor was 
it acceptable. 
On 16 August the navy commanders were asked to form an allied fleet. The 
British fleet was the largest with nine vessels, 1 even though no British ships 
had been fired on. The French fleet was strengthened to three ships. The Dutch 
had four ships, and the Americans one small steamer with one gun. 
On 25 August the naval commanders were ordered to destroy the batteries 
and take a position on the strait and hold it in order to extract an indemnity 
for the cost of operations. On the 28th the combined fleet sailed for Shimonoseki. 
On 5 September after passing a night in front of the Strait, the ships prepared 
-54-
for action. The fleet was divided into a heavy and a light squadron, with the 
British flagship and three other ships anchored off Maeda”mura out of range 
of the shore guns. 
The British admiral opened fire at ten minutes past four in the afternoon. 
The whole fleet joined in. The heavy squadron engaged Choshu batteries at 
Tanoura on the Kyushu coast, while the light squadron attacked the Honshu 
side. Just after five p.m. all firing stopped. 
Early next morning, however, the Japanese opened fire again from 
Maeda-mura. The battery was silenced by fire from the ships, and 1900 men 
were put ashore to destroy the batteries and take away the guns. Some wooden 
guns, good for one shot only, were found. ( An example can be seen to this 
day in the Shimonoseki Municipal Museum in the grounds of the temple of 
Kouzanji ). At noon Ito Shunsuke arrived and began peace negotiations. 
The teロns agreed upon stated that foreign ships were to be treated in a 
friendly way and allowed to buy coal, water and food in Shimonoseki. New 
batteries were not to be erected, nor the old ones repaired. A ransom of three 
million dollars was to be paid because Shimonoseki city had been spared, to 
be divided between the allied powers who had contributed to the naval force 
in the action. 
The above outline is mainly taken from Moeshart’s account, which in tum 
mostly uses Dutch sourc四，including the National Archives in The Hague. It 
is time now to investigate other sources. 
One interesting source is E. H. House ’s account written in 1875 . House was 
an American journalist resident in Tokyo. Of the payment of the indemnity 
(ransom) he states that the last instalment was delivered in July, 1874. Yet 
“To Japan, the subj民t has for ye訂s been one of annoy如ce and mortification. 
The justice of the exaction has never been recognized by出at nation, and出e
int句rity of the motives by which it was dictated has always been doub胞d.”
House further seeks to demonstrate eleven points includin膨
“I . That there is good ground for disputing the right of the above mer鴎旬ned
three ships to be where they were when fired upon .• • • 
V. That although the plan of despatching a navel 出ped悩伺
-55-
was mainly inspired by the British Minister, no ship belonging to his nation 
had ever been assailed at that place .... 
VI. That the course of the British Minister was repeatedly disapproved and
the expedition forbidden by his Government; and that he was justified only
after his measures had been carried out, when condemnation would have
been of no avail ..
X. That the claim was not laid, as alleged, for 
“ damage 
”
and “ expense
”
；
but was purposely made exorbitant, in the hope that it could not be paid
and that the Japanese Government would be constrained to make important
political concessions, as an equivalent ．．．．”
With regard to his first point, House cites International Law relating to Turkey
and the Sea of Marmora, as explained by Wheaton. He concludes：
“
If international 
precedents have any value whatsoever, it is sufficiently clear that neither 
merchant nor war vessels of foreign countries had the right, in 1863 or at any 
other time, to enter the Strait of Shimonoseki or to traverse the Inland Sea.
” 
His fifth and sixth points cannot be denied. Indeed Satow admits the sixth 
point in his memoirs. ( See Diplomat in ]aρan p.134.) The tenth point is 
difficult to refute: certainly $ 3 million must have been disproportionate to the 
damage su旺ered by foreign ships and expenses of the punitive expedition. 
Yet it would be wrong to accept all of House’s views uncritically. He was 
known to be anti-British, and inclined to character assassination of British 
diplomats, especially Neale, Alcock and Parkes. We should also examine the 
testimony of Sir Ernest Mason Satow in his memoirs which includes eye witness 
reports of the attack on Shimonoseki ( Diplomat Chs. IX, X and XI ) . 
Satow approaches the affair from his professional standpoint as a· diplomat 
charged with promoting and protecting British trade with Japan. He refers to 
“a diminution of western prestige 
”
involved in ships being forced to avoid 
the easy passage through the Straits of Shimonoseki and instead encounter “the 
stormy Cape Chichakoff
”
on the way from Nagasaki to Yokohama. He also 
makes it clear that trade was the paramount British concern: 
“Nothing but the complete subjugation of this warlike clan, and the permanent 
destruction of its means of offence, would suffice to convince the Japanese nation 
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that we were determined to enforce the treaties, and to caπy on our trade 
without molestation from anybody, irrespective of internal dissensions.
” 
In short the Japanese must be taught once and for all that they should 
not interfere with foreign ships for any reasons. Shimonoseki was to be an 
object lesson to demonstrate the military strength of the foreign powers. From 
the British viewpoint it was therefore quite irrelevant that no British ships had 
been attacked in the Strait of Shimonoseki. 
In addition, Admirai Kuper's fleet which had been summoned to bombard 
Kagoshima in the summer of 1863 was conveniently stationed at Yokohama 
for just such an eventuality. 
Satow describes the naval operations at Shimonoseki in Chapter X of his 
memoirs. He was clearly delighted to be embarked on board Kuper's flagship 
Euryalus as interpreter. ( One other civilian was Felix Beato2 who took a famous 
photograph of the Maeda Mura gun battery after capture by the allied troops. ) 
Satow describes in considerable detail the taking of the batteries. He lists British 
casualties after two days of operation as eight killed and thirty wounded. He 
further notes that：
“
Sir Rutherford ( Alcock ) contemplated nothing less than 
the complete subjugation of the Choushiu clan'.' To this end he had tried to 
persuade Kuper to attack Hagi on the north coast of Honshu, but the Admiral 
had refused to comply with the request of the civil repr，白entative of Her Majesty. 
Chapter XI of Satow’s memoirs mainly describes the peace negotiations in 
detail in which Ito Shunsuke played an important part as a trusted intermediary. 
Of the “ransom
”
demanded he says: 
“
The fixing of an indemnity was intended only to provide a means of pressure 
upon the Tycoon’s government in order to procure the Mikado’s ratification 
of the treaties, and the consequent extension of commercial relation.” 
( This may indeed be one of the “important political concessions 
”
to which 
House refers. ) 
In Chapter XII Satow concedes that there was criticism of Alcock’s stance 
by the Foreign Office in London, especially from Lord Russell.3 Indeed Alcock 
was recalled, a most unusual step amounting to a
“
severe censure ".4 
“But arriving just at the moment when his policy had been successful in 
円tphu 
every direction, and when all foreigners in the country were united in a chorus 
of gratitude to him for his energetic action . . . the displeasure of Lord John 
Russell was not a matter of much moment. The crushing defeat of Choushiu 
by the foreign squadrons ... restored confidence to the Tycoon’s government, 
and enabled them to declare firmly to the Mikado that the idea of expelling 
foreigners from the country and putting an end to trade was utterly and entirely 
impracticable, while on the other hand the demonstrated superiority of European 
methods of warfare had converted our bitterest . . . foes into fast friends.” 
Finally Satow states that the Shogun’s government voluntarily undertook 
to be responsible for the indemnity 叩d on October 22nd
“
a convention was 
signed by a member of the Shogun ’s second council and the four foreign 
representatives by which three million dollars were to be paid in satisfaction 
of all claims, or as an alternative the opening of Shimonoseki or some other 
port in the inland sea, if the Tycoon preferred to offer it and the Powers were 
willing to accept.” 
Concluding Remarks 
The Shimonoseki Affair was a clash of aロns precipitated by the complex 
and unstable internal politics of Japan, and the determination of foreign powers 
to protect and maintain their trade with that country. For some detached 
observers ( eg. House) it was the unforgivable assertion of imperialist occidental 
powers. For others more directly involved ( eg. Satow) it was a necessary and 
unavoidable consequence of aggression by the Choshu clan against foreign 
shipping. For the Japanese themselves it was a second object lesson in the 
military might of western powers following the bombardment of Kagoshima 
in the previous year. 
Like the Kagoshima Affair which had been settled the previous year, there 
was one positive and fruitful outcome. The Choshu clan became firm friends 
with the foreign powers ( especially the British ) and no hard feelings lingered 
to bedevil future relations.5 
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Notes 
1 . Many Japanese accounts say there were ten British vessels. ( See Kaikoku to 
Toubaku p. 138. ) Tanaka believes 出ey may be including a vessel laden wi出 coal.
2. Beato published a collection of photographs of Japan at the end of the Edo era.
He had also served as a cameraman in the Crimean War and, according to Satow,
in the Anglo-French expedition to North China in 1859.
3 . See Sir Rutherford Alcock: A Reassessment by Sir Hugh Cortazzi in “The Transactions 
of the Asiatic Society of Japan ”（ fourth series, volume 9 , 1鈎4 ). The difficult and 
strained relationship between Alcock and Lord Russell， 白pecially wi出 regard to 
the use of miltary force against the Bakufu, is traced in detail by reference to 
diplomatic despatches. 
4. Lord Russell subsequently thought better of his action ( see Diplomat in Japan 
pp. 134-5), and Alcock was sent to Peking as Minister.
Cortazzi comments ： “ As Peking was in those days the better paid and considered
to be the more important of the two posts 出is was in e任配t a promotion for Alcock
”
．
( p. 39 , Transactions) 
5. See D妙lomat p. 12 9： “ Having beaten the Choushiu p回ple, we had come to like
and respect them ... 
＇’ 
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